University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
College of Education Publications

College of Education

4-7-2004

Education Policy Analysis Archives 12/14
Arizona State University
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub
Part of the Education Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Arizona State University and University of South Florida, "Education Policy Analysis Archives 12/14 " (2004). College of Education
Publications. Paper 476.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub/476

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Education at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College
of Education Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

A peer-reviewed scholarly
journal
Editor: Gene V Glass
College of Education
Arizona State University
Copyright is retained by the first or sole author, who grants right of first
publication to the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES. EPAA
is a project of the Education Policy Studies Laboratory.
Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current Index to
Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Assessment and
Evaluation and are permanently archived in Resources in Education.

Volume 12 Number 14

April 7, 2004

ISSN 1068-2341

How Feasible is Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)? Simulations
of School AYP “Uniform Averaging” and “Safe Harbor” under
the No Child Left Behind Act
Jaekyung Lee
SUNY at Buffalo
Citation: Lee, J., (2004, April 7). How Feasible is Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)? Simulations of
School AYP “Uniform Averaging” and “Safe Harbor” under the No Child Left Behind Act. Education
Policy Analysis Archives, 12(14). Retrieved [Date] from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n14/.

Abstract
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) requires that
schools make “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) towards the goal
of having 100 percent of their students become proficient by year
2013-14. Through simulation analyses of Maine and Kentucky
school performance data collected during the 1990s, this study
investigates how feasible schools would have met the AYP
targets if the mandate had been applied in the past with “uniform
averaging (rolling averages)” and “safe harbor” options that have
potential to help reduce the number of schools needing
improvement or corrective action. Contrary to some expectations,
the applications of both options would do little to reduce the risk
of massive school failure due to unreasonably high AYP targets
for all student groups. Implications of the results for the NCLB
school accountability system and possible ways to make the
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current AYP more feasible and fair are discussed.
The reauthorized Elementary and Secondary School Act (ESEA), No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), requires standards-based accountability for schools
receiving Title I funds. One major component of this accountability policy is to
report whether the schools are making “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) based
on performance targets set by their state (i.e., 100% of students become
proficient within 12 years from the baseline year). Since the passage of the
NCLB, much concern has been raised about the AYP mandates and their
possible consequences for schools that repeatedly fail to meet their AYP target
(Linn, 2003).
Previous studies pointed out that some critical problems with AYP-based school
accountability policies foreshadow technical challenges that lie ahead (Hill,
1997; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Kim & Sunderman, 2004; La Marca, 2003; Lee,
2003; Lee & Coladarci, 2002; Linn & Haug, 2002; Thum, 2002). While the
studies raised technical issues such as reliability and validity with regard to AYP
measures or pointed out policy implementation problems such as the lack of
capacity and resources, the options available for schools to take advantage of
under the NCLB have not been studied and discussed systematically.
Specifically, there are two options available under the current NCLB legislation,
that is, (1) uniform averaging (NCLB, 2001, Section 1111(b)(2)(J)) and (2) safe
harbor (NCLB, 2001, Section 1111(b)(2)(I)), that might not only help improve the
reliability or fairness of the AYP measure but also help save schools from failing
to meet the AYP target. It remains to be examined whether and how those
options might affect the feasibility of AYP that should be the most pressing
issue for schools.
First, the uniform averaging procedure is designed to address a reliability issue:
Does AYP measure schools’ academic progress with sufficient consistency and
stability? The typical school AYP measures tend to be highly vulnerable to
fluctuation as they rely on comparison of successive cohort groups (as opposed
to tracking the same cohort of students); it is particularly problematic in small
schools which might have very few students for certain demographic category.
In light of this difficulty, the NCLB permits aggregating data from multiple years
to increase sample size for more reliable estimation of the target group’s
performance. While the term “uniform averaging” has not been clearly defined
in either statistical or policy terms, it was interpreted as allowing for multiple
approaches to aggregating multiple years’ data and being able to use the
techniques for either or both, status or/and improvement evaluations (Marion et
al., 2002). For example, schools can average test scores from the current
school year with test scores from the preceding two years, and this rolling
average is designed to mitigate the fact that student performance can vary
widely from year to year due to factors beyond a school’s control such as
changes in the demographic composition of student populations (“Raising The
Bar,” 2002). While the primary purpose of using this rolling average option is to
make the school AYP measure more reliable, it can also help improve the
fairness of school accountability system by reducing the chance that small
schools or small subgroups within schools would be left out of reporting due to
the states’ minimum group size (N) requirement. Moreover, it needs to be
noted that the uniform averaging option also has some potential to help
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struggling schools meet the AYP target under the circumstance of declining test
scores. Does this option really work to save a school with downward
performance trend from being identified by the state as failing AYP?
Second, the safe harbor provision is designed to address a fairness issue: Does
AYP measure school progress in a way that different groups of students in the
same school can meet the same performance target at different rates?
Basically, the law requires that schools disaggregate the test results into
subgroups (e.g., major racial/ethnic groups, economically disadvantaged
students, students with disabilities, English Language Learners) and have all of
them meet the same AYP target. This requirement has the danger of assuming
that all categories will move forward at the same rates (NECEPL, 2002).
However, the NCLB also gives schools the option of a “safe harbor”, which is
designed to lesson the difficulty of reaching the same AYP target for all groups
of students at the same rates and give academically viable schools a second
chance. For school where the performance of one or more student subgroups
on one or both of reading and math assessments fails to meet AYP targets, the
school will be considered to have reached AYP under this provision if the
percentage of students in that group who failed to reach proficiency decreased
by 10 percent from the preceding year and also the group made progress on
another academic indicator. Is this option powerful enough to save an at-risk
school from being identified by the state as failing AYP?
It was estimated that up to 80 percent of schools in some states could be
targeted as needing improvement or corrective action in the first few years
(Marion et al., 2002; Olson, 2002, April 18). These earlier predictions from state
simulations used only student assessment results without looking at test
participation rates, other academic indicators, or “safe harbor” provisions under
the NCLB (Marion et al., 2002). Since those earlier predictions came before the
U.S. Department of Education’s guidance or regulations for AYP, it was pointed
out that some of the interpretations states have used in building their projections
may not have taken advantage of all the options available (Olson, 2002, April
18). Therefore, we need new predictions with the options enabled, and the
result may or may not differ from the earlier predictions.
In this paper, I focused on the issue of feasibility and investigate several “what
if” questions through simulation analyses of the data collected from Maine and
Kentucky schools during the 1990s: how the NCLB’s AYP formula would have
worked if we had applied it to past school performance data and what would
have happened if we had applied options that the current formula permits.
Specifically, the objective of this study was to (a) investigate the feasibility of the
current AYP requirements for schools and (b) explore the impact of using
“uniform averaging (rolling average)” and “safe harbor” options on the AYP
results. I examined whether and how application of “rolling average” and “safe
harbor” provisions improve the chance of meeting AYP target over the long run
and at the same time reduce the risk of failing to meet the AYP for 2-5
consecutive years. The answer to questions of who might win or lose from the
current AYP race and how we can make this measurement-driven accountability
strategy more realistic and fair for all may provide insight that will guide
policymaking.
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Data and Methods
Aggregate school performance data from all public schools in two states,
Kentucky and Maine, were collected and examined. Early on, both states (a)
established student assessment systems to monitor their schools’ academic
progress and (b) made a greater effort to align their assessments with their
content and performance standards (Lee & McIntire, 2002). Despite these
common characteristics, the two states’ assessments differed significantly in
terms of the stakes attached to the assessment results: high-stakes test in
Kentucky vs. low-stakes test in Maine. The 8th grade mathematics achievement
data collected from the two states’ student assessments were used for analysis:
the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) for the 1993-98
period and the Maine Educational Assessment (MEA) for the 1995-98 period.
Because both states changed their state assessments since 1999, and the
results were not directly comparable to old ones, all of these analyses were
restricted to the pre-1999 period. Using only data collected after the NCLB
legislation was not considered to be a viable option, because the data were
available for only one or two years and they were not sufficient for an estimation
of the longer-term consequences.
In congruence with the NCLB AYP requirements, standards-based
interpretation of the test results were applied to determine academic
performance of students against the performance standards set by the state.
For the Maine data, the percentage of students scoring at or above “Advanced”
level on the 1995-1998 MEA was used; for Kentucky, the percentage of
students scoring at or above “Proficient” on the 1993-1998 KIRIS was used.
Both “Advanced” and “Proficient” levels were next to the highest among four
achievement levels and can be regarded as meeting state performance
standards. Indeed, these two states’ proficiency standards were set at a highly
comparable level (in Kentucky) or at an even higher level (in Maine) than their
corresponding proficiency standard on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP). For example, the percentages of 8th grade students in
Kentucky who turned out to perform at or above Proficient level in mathematics
as of 1996 were 16 on the NAEP and 14 on the KIRIS; the corresponding
percentages in Maine were 31 on the NAEP and 9 on the MEA.
First of all, the current AYP rules were used to determine baseline and annual
AYP targets in each state: the percentage of students proficient in a school at
each state’s 20th percentile rank in the first available year was used as the
baseline AYP target. On top of that baseline, equal increments were made
every year so that the AYP target becomes 100 in 12 years. Therefore, the
baseline AYP target for Maine schools was set to be zero in 1995, and the
subsequent AYP target added an increment of 8.3 every year to make its
ultimate target equal to 100. Likewise, the baseline AYP target for Kentucky was
set to be 8.8 in 1993, and the subsequent AYP target added an increment of
7.6 every year to reach 100 in 12 years from the baseline.
Given such hypothetical AYP target lines, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the
distributions of school AYP measures (i.e., the percentage of 8th grade students
deemed proficient on the state math assessment) respectively in Maine and
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Kentucky. In Maine, schools made very modest amount of gain, that is, about 1
percent gain per year on average so that they got farther and farther behind the
AYP target over time (see Figure 1). In 1996 (Year 2), more than half of the
schools in Maine were already performing below the AYP target, and a large
majority of schools were so two years later (Year 4). While schools in Kentucky
made relatively larger achievement gains (on average 3 percent gain per year)
than their counterparts in Maine during the period, they also could not have
caught up with the AYP target that grew more rapidly (see Figure 2).

Figure 1. Maine Schools’ 1995-98 Performance Trends against
Hypothetical AYP Targets in 8th Grade MEA Mathematics
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Figure 2. Kentucky Schools’ 1993-98 Performance Trends against
Hypothetical AYP Targets in 8th Grade KIRIS Mathematics

Assessing the effect of the “Rolling Average” option on school
AYP
Under the “rolling average” (uniform averaging procedure) provision, it is
assumed that schools can average test scores from the current school year with
test scores from the preceding one or two years. This works in a school’s favor
when test scores decline but it works against a school when scores rise. If this
rolling average option is used every time regardless of individual schools’
variable growth patterns, it can result in a greater number of schools being
identified as failing to meet AYP every year. This could have happened in both
Maine and Kentucky because their schools on average made progress over the
course of 4 or 6-year periods. In this study, it was assumed that the rolling
average procedure was used by schools only when they obviously benefited
from the option (i.e., when school performance declined). According to Scott
Marion, who was the co-chair of the Joint Study Group on Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) and co-authored a report (Marion et al., 2002), this assumption
may not be unreasonable: “To be fair, schools shouldn't be able pick and
choose when they can use the multi-year average. However, we've suggested
that the state set up an appeal process whereby schools that miss AYP
because of the earlier years included in the multi-year average be granted an
appeal. So it is sort of like picking and choosing when to apply multi-year
averages, but it occurs through the appeal process.” (Personal communication,
March 18, 2004). Nevertheless, whether states would actually allow schools to
use the rolling average option in such a flexible way remains an open question
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(see Erpenbarch, Forte-Fast, Potts, 2003 for examples of state plans).
The following rule was employed in this simulation’s determination of using
rolling average for AYP calculation: If the rolling average score (i.e., the mean of
scores from current year plus preceding two years) is greater than current year
score, then the rolling average is used; otherwise the current year score is used
instead. Simple averaging method was used without any weighting.
If (Xt-2 + X t-1 + X t)/3 > Xt, then AYP = (Xt-2 + X t-1 + X t)/3
Otherwise AYP = X t
where X t-2 = Percent proficient at year t-2, X t-1 = Percent proficient at year t-1,
X t = Percent proficient at year t (current year)
Simulation analyses of the estimates of schools that would have failed to meet
the AYP target with or without this rolling average procedure were conducted.
Because sanctions may apply to schools which fail to meet AYP for two or more
consecutive years, the focus of this analysis was schools that belong to this
high-risk category. Some schools which may fail often but not in a row would not
be designated as “in need of improvement” according to the regulation. Odds
ratio was computed to compare the relative risk of failure with vs. without using
the rolling average option.

Assessing the effect of the “Safe Harbor” option on school AYP
The “safe harbor” provision applies to schools in which one or more of the
subgroups of students fail to reach their uniform, schoolwide AYP target.
According to the provision, the school shall be considered to have made
adequate yearly progress if the percentage of students in that group who did not
meet or exceed the proficient level of achievement on the state assessments for
that year decreased by 10 percent of that percentages from the preceding
school year and that group made progress on one or more of academic
indicators. Although this option implies giving some recognition to schools which
have made certain minimum level of progress for every subgroup despite its
uneven success among different subgroups, the amount of progress required
for this safe harbor application varies among subgroups; the school has to
demonstrate a greater progress for a subgroup which performs at a relatively
lower level in terms of its percent proficient students. While the uniform
averaging procedure can also be used to combine multiple years’ data for the
safe harbor review, there are variations among different states in their
approaches to addressing the inherent instability of gain scores (see
Erpenbarch, Forte-Fast, Potts, 2003 for examples of state plans).
To examine how the “Safe Harbor” option would work for low-income students,
one of the subgroups as identified by students who were eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch, was chosen. Before the NCLB legislation, disaggregated
student performance data was hardly available. The school aggregate
performance data collected from both Maine and Kentucky was not an
exception to this conventional reporting pattern as they did not break down the
aggregated results by demographic subgroups. In the absence of school-level
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data on the achievement of students in free/reduced school lunch program, the
statewide average achievement results based on the NAEP 1996 8th grade
state math assessment were used for estimation. At the same time, the
absence of data on another academic indicator (e.g., performance on another
type of test or retention/promotion rate) precluded an application of the
requirement.
The percent students at or above the NAEP proficient level was 23 for
non-eligible students and 4 for eligible ones in Kentucky. Likewise, the percent
students at or above the NAEP proficient level was 35 for non-eligible students
and 18 for eligible ones in Maine. For the sake of simplifying calculations, the
21-point difference was assumed to be uniform across all schools and constant
over time in Maine (see equation 1.1 below); In case of Kentucky, 21 in
equation 1.1 was replaced by 17. In addition, the entire school AYP measure
was specified as a function of summing each subgroup’s rolling-AYP measure
weighted by the percentage of students in each category (see equation 1.2
below). The following simultaneous equations were solved together to estimate
each school’s percent proficient free/reduced lunch students:
Xi – Yi = 21
(Xi Pxi + Yi Pyi)/100 = Zi

(1.1)
(1.2)

where Xi = percent proficient students among those who are not eligible for
free/reduced lunch in school i; Yi = percent proficient students among those
who are eligible for free/reduced lunch in school i; Zi = percent proficient
students total in school i; Pxi = percent students who are not eligible for
free/reduced lunch in school i; Pyi = percent students who are eligible for
free/reduced lunch in school i (i.e., 100 – Pxi).
In the above equations, Zi, Pxi, and Pyi are known variables available from the
data and their values are used to estimate Xi and Yi. With the estimated
percentage of free/reduced lunch students who are proficient in each school at
year t (Y t), the following safe harbor rule was applied to schools which
otherwise would fail to meet the AYP target for free/reduced lunch students: If
((100 – Y t) – (100 – Y t-1)) ≥ (100 – Y t)/10, then schools would be regarded as
meeting the AYP target for free/reduced lunch students. It was assumed that
the group made progress on another academic indicator. Odds ratio was
computed to compare the relative risk of failure with vs. without using the safe
harbor option.

Results
When using the current AYP goal and timeline (100% proficient within 12 years)
on retrospective school performance data (1993-98 in Kentucky and 1995-98 in
Maine), the percentage of schools that would meet their AYP target overall
turned out to decrease exponentially over the course of the first few years (see
Table 1). In Kentucky, it was 80 percent in the first year, plummeted to 36
percent in the 4th year, and further down to 10 percent in the 6th year. In Maine,
it started as 100 percent in the first year (because baseline AYP goal was set to
0), became 44 percent in the 2nd year, and dropped down to 6 percent in the
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4th year. This implies that most schools would have enormous difficulty meeting
the NCLB AYP requirement that appears to be an unrealistic expectation given
a relatively high performance standard (proficient) and a relatively short time
line (12 years).
Even when the rolling average option was used, it would have only slightly
increased the chance of schools’ meeting the AYP target (see Table 1). The
odds of meeting AYP target with the rolling average was only 1.06 - 1.24 times
greater than the odds of meeting AYP target without the rolling average. With
the rolling averaging option, the percentage of schools that would meet their
AYP target in the 2nd year, for example, may increase from 44.3 to 46 in Maine
and from 35.9 to 39.5 in Kentucky. This implies that the rolling average has very
weak potential to save schools from being identified as failing when their scores
decline.
Table 1. Percentage of Maine and Kentucky Schools that would Meet AYP
Target with vs. without Rolling Average Option
Maine
Year

Kentucky

Rolling

OR

No Rolling

Rolling

OR

1

100.0

80.4

2

44.3

46.0

1.07

66.1

69.5

1.17

3

10.5

12.7

1.24

61.4

62.8

1.06

4

5.9

7.2

1.24

35.9

39.5

1.17

5

28.3

30.5

1.11

6

10.3

10.9

1.07

Note: OR is the odds ratio of given percentages, i.e., the ratio of the odds of
schools meeting the AYP target for all students each year with a rolling average
of their corresponding odds of passing without the rolling average option.
The percentage of schools that would fail to meet AYP for two consecutive
years at least once was very high: 75 percent in Kentucky and 87 percent in
Maine (see Table 2). While the risk tends to drop significantly for the longer
periods, it still remains a substantial threat to most schools. The failure rate for
three years in a row would be as high as 57 percent in Kentucky and 52 percent
in Maine. Although the failure rate for 5 consecutive years was less than 10
percent in Kentucky for the 6-year period, the risk would have been much
greater for full 12-year cycle.
Table 2. Percentage of Maine and Kentucky Schools that would Fail to
Meet AYP Target for 2-5 Consecutive Years with vs. without Rolling
Average Option
Maine
Frequency

Rolling

Kentucky
OR
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No Rolling

Rolling

OR

2 Years

87.3

86.5

.93

75.2

73.3

.91

3 Years

51.9

50.2

.93

57.1

55.9

.95

4 Years

0.0

0.0

17.7

17.1

.96

8.5

8.8

1.04

5 Year

Note: OR is the odds ratio of given percentages, i.e., the ratio of the odds of
schools failing to meet the AYP target for free/reduced lunch students for 2-5
years in a row with safe harbor to their corresponding odds of consecutive
failure without the safe harbor option.
The use of the rolling average procedure helps reduce consecutive failure rates
in both states. As with the single-time failure rate, however, the degree of this
risk reduction tends to be very small (see Table 2). The odds of failing to meet
AYP target for consecutive years with the rolling average is .91 - 1.04 times
greater than the odds of failing without the rolling average.
Applying the AYP target to a subgroup of low-income students (i.e., students
who receive free/reduced lunch in this analysis) increases the risk of school
failure about two to three times. The percentage of schools that would meet the
AYP target for this particular disadvantaged group in Year 2 is only 6 in Maine
and 32 in Kentucky (see Table 3). These figures were much smaller than
corresponding figures estimated with the entire group of students in each school
(cf. Table 1).
Table 3. Percentage of Maine and Kentucky Schools that would Meet AYP
Target for Low-Income Students (Eligible for Free/Reduced Lunch) with
vs. without Safe Harbor Option
Maine

Kentucky

Year No Safe Harbor Safe Harbor OR No Safe Harbor Safe Harbor

OR

1

100.0

36.7

2

5.7

7.2

1.28

31.9

36.4

1.22

3

1.4

5.3

3.94

30.8

37.2

1.33

4

0.5

2.4

4.89

13.9

33.8

3.16

5

10.9

20.2

2.07

6

3.4

29.1

11.66

Note: OR is the odds ratio of given percentages, i.e., the ratio of the odds of
schools’ meeting the AYP target for all students each year with safe harbor to
their corresponding odds of passing without safe harbor option.
Using the “safe harbor” option increases the chance that schools would meet
the AYP target for free/reduced lunch students (see Table 3). The odds ratio for
meeting AYP target with the safe harbor ranges from 1.22 to 11.66. However,
this might have overestimated the effect because the requirement of making
progress on another academic indicator was not considered. At the same time,
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using the safe harbor option reduces the risk of being identified as a failing
school for consecutive years and facing undesirable consequences (see Table
4). The odds ratio for failing to meet AYP target for 2-5 years in a row with the
safe harbor ranges from .23 to .75. Even with this option, however, the risk
remains high, and up to 90 percent of schools will be regarded as needing
improvement. While this estimation was based on only one subgroup, that is,
economically disadvantaged students, simultaneous evaluation of other
subgroups including students with learning disabilities and LEP/ELL students
may result in greater failure rates.
Table 4. Percentage of Maine and Kentucky Schools that would Fail to
Meet AYP Target for Low-Income Students (Eligible for Free/Reduced
Lunch) for 2-5 Consecutive Years with vs. without Safe Harbor Option
Maine
Year

Kentucky

No Safe Harbor Safe Harbor OR No Safe Harbor Safe Harbor OR

2 Years

98.6

94.3

.23

94.1

86.9

.42

3 Years

93.8

91.9

.75

84.1

66.8

.38

4 Years

0.0

0.0

49.2

39.4

.67

37.0

39.5

.71

5 Year

Note: OR is the odds ratio of given percentages, i.e., the ratio of the odds of
schools’ failing to meet the AYP target for free/reduced lunch students for 2-5
years in a row with safe harbor to their corresponding odds of consecutive
failure without safe harbor option.
Now we can compare all the results of this simulation analysis under four
different scenarios: (1) applying AYP to the entire group of students schoolwide
without using the rolling average and safe harbor options, (2) applying AYP to
the entire group of students schoolwide with the rolling average option only, (3)
applying AYP to the entire group of students schoolwide as well as the
subgroup of free/reduced lunch students with the rolling average option but
without the safe harbor option, and (4) applying AYP to the entire group of
students schoolwide as well as the subgroup of free/reduced lunch students
with both the rolling average and the safe harbor options. The results that would
be obtained under the above-mentioned four different scenarios are compared
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 with abbreviated labels of each scenario: (1) No Rolling
Average, (2) Rolling Average, (3) No Safe Harbor, and (4) Safe Harbor.
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Figure 3. Percentages of schools in Maine and Kentucky that would meet
AYP Target under different options.
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Figure 4. Percentages of schools in Maine and Kentucky that would fail to
meet AYP for 2-5 years in a row.
First of all, we apply the AYP target to the entire body of students but not to
subgroups in each school and do not use the rolling average and safe harbor
options (see “No Rolling Average” lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4). Such
schoolwide application of the AYP formula without looking into subgroups was
what the states typically did for evaluating school AYP before the NCLB
legislation. By using the rolling average option schoolwide, we can show some
improvement in the chance of schools meeting AYP each year and for
consecutive years as well, but the difference is highly marginal (see “Rolling
Average” lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4). Now by applying AYP to a group of
low-income students as the NCLB requires, we see substantial increases in the
risk of school failure (see “No Safe Harbor” lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4). By
and large, the comparison shows the benefit of using the safe harbor option, but
it also reveals that the option is not strong enough to save many struggling
disadvantaged schools from the risk (see “Safe Harbor” lines in Figure 3 and
Figure 4).

Discussion
Policy implications of this study need to be discussed carefully given the fact
that the findings are based on the simulation analysis of the past school
performance data in a single grade and a single subject area from two selected
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states. It needs to be noted that the study has some unwarranted assumptions
about school AYP measures and targets within the parameters of the NCLB and
that the actual results can be quite different if the two states make different
choices (e.g., using an index measure of AYP, increasing the AYP target in a
nonlinear, stepwise fashion). Whatever estimation methods used, this study
might underestimate or overestimate the schools’ future progress expected
under this new legislation, NCLB. The results may have been different if schools
had faced in the past the stronger incentives embodied in current AYP rules.
Moreover, the results might be different if the performance standard used in the
past is significantly higher or lower than the current performance standard
adopted under new testing systems in both states. However, the comparison of
Kentucky and Maine (high-stakes testing vs. low-stakes testing environments
with their commonly challenging state assessments and high performance
standards) can give us an insight into possible consequences of the NCLB AYP
policy for schools across the nation.
With these caveats in mind, the results of this simulation analysis turn out to
provide very gloomy projections of schools’ chance to meet the AYP target,
warning federal and state education policymakers against massive school
failure under the NCLB. It does not appear to be feasible for many schools
across the nation to meet the current AYP target within its given 12-year
timeline. It is not realistic to expect schools to make unreasonably large
achievement gains compared with what they did in the past. Many schools are
doomed to fail unless drastic actions are taken to modify the course of the
NCLB AYP policy or slow its pace. Contrary to some expectations, using both
rolling average and safe harbor options does not work to reduce the risk of
massive school failure. Although the rolling average can help improve more
stable estimation of school performance, it hardly reduces the risk of school
failure. The safe harbor option also fails to provide a strong safety net to at-risk
schools despite what its name implies.
When a majority of schools fail, there will not be enough model sites for
benchmarking nor enough resources for capacity building and interventions.
This situation can raise a challenging question to the policymakers: is it school
or policy that is really failing? There is a potential threat to the validity of the
NCLB school accountability policy ultimately if such prevailing school failure
occurs as an artifact of policy mandates with unrealistically high expectations
that were not based on scientific research and empirical evidence.
One approach that policymakers can consider to make the AYP targets more
realistic and fair might be to use an effect size measure for guidance. For
example, one might reasonably expect that schools should make progress
every year by say 20% of the standard deviation of school-level percent
proficient measure; this amounts to about 2.5 - 3.0 percent in Kentucky and 1.5
– 2.0 percent in Maine. This amount of progress may be regarded as small by
conventional statistical standard (Cohen, 1977), but it is exactly what an
average school in both states managed to accomplish in the past. In a similar
vein, one can consider setting the safe harbor threshold for a subgroup at
certain percentage of the standard deviation (e.g., reduce the percentage of
non-proficient low-income students by 10% of the standard deviation). A similar
suggestion along with the use of scale score rather than percent proficient was
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made by other analysts (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2002).
While using an effect size metric with scale scores may help set more realistic
performance targets and better recognize schools’ academic progress, it is not
permissible under the current law. This idea also raises questions as to whether
to use standard deviation of student-level test scores or school-level average
test scores and whether to derive the standard deviation from original test score
variance or residual variance with adjustments for demographic differences
among students and their schools. In Maine and Kentucky, the school-level
standard deviation was only 40 percent of the student-level standard deviation
of mathematics achievement scores. Once the differences among schools in
their students’ racial and socioeconomic background characteristics, the
adjusted school-level variance of residuals is reduced further down to the half of
original school-level variance (see Lee & Coladarci, 2002 for the analysis of
within-school vs. between-school math achievement distributions in Maine and
Kentucky).
Using different methods with different measures would produce different results
and, consequently, different conclusions. Whether one prefers a
criterion-referenced or norm-referenced approach to setting AYP target and
evaluating school progress, the ultimate concern is not simply improving the
feasibility of schools’ meeting their AYP targets in the short term but rather
enhancing the schools’ capacity for sustained academic improvement over the
long haul. Given limited amount of resources available from the federal
government and limited capacity of the state agencies as well, reducing the
identification of schools in need of improvement would help states provide more
targeted assistance to a smaller number of disadvantaged schools which have
a large number of at-risk students. Nevertheless, applying the AYP options such
as rolling averages and safe harbor had better not be compromised by future
prospect of limited support and short-term interests in reducing school
identifications. The long-term success of school accountability system does not
depend on the number of passing schools but on the results of student
achievement.

Note
This article is based upon work supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. 9970853. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions
or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. This
study simply utilizes the past school performance data from Maine and
Kentucky for simulation analyses, but all assumptions, results, and
interpretations given in the article have nothing to do with the two states’ current
AYP policies and outcomes. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the 2003 AERA annual meeting in Chicago. E-mail JL224@buffalo.edu for
correspondence about this manuscript.
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